Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.028zbMath1406.92439OpenAlexW2171546425WikidataQ50707776 ScholiaQ50707776MaRDI QIDQ1716195

Michael E. Price, Masanori Takezawa

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.01.028

zbMATH Keywords

reciprocitycollective actionevolution of cooperationassortative interactionreciprocal altruism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Animal behavior (92D50) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Related Items (6)

Evolution of stinginess and generosity in finite populations ⋮ Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient? ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
• Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Game theory and human evolution: a critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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