A Pareto optimal auction mechanism for carbon emission rights
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1718409
DOI10.1155/2014/438104zbMath1407.91189OpenAlexW2007586300WikidataQ59067260 ScholiaQ59067260MaRDI QIDQ1718409
Chuangyin Dang, Mingxi Wang, Mingrong Wang, Shou-Yang Wang
Publication date: 8 February 2019
Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/438104
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items
Designing a double auction mechanism for the re-allocation of emission permits, Multistage investment actions with the emission cap
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Dynamics analysis of a class of delayed economic model
- Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes
- Carbon leakages: a general equilibrium view
- Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
- Exploring the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions: the threshold revenue and the threshold-price rule
- Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
- A multiple criteria decision-aid approach in defining national priorities for greenhouse gases emissions reduction in the energy sector
- Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items
- Descending price multi-item auctions
- A multiple criteria decision making approach for electricity planning in Spain: economic versus environmental objectives
- A Double-Track Adjustment Process for Discrete Markets With Substitutes and Complements
