The regulatory strategy in emissions trading system under costly enforcement

DOI10.1155/2014/487912zbMath1407.91187OpenAlexW2057873334WikidataQ59067691 ScholiaQ59067691MaRDI QIDQ1718509

Shuai Jin, Yanlin Zhang, Zhao-Han Sheng

Publication date: 8 February 2019

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/487912

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
• Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system
• Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

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