Mechanism design of fashion virtual enterprise under monitoring strategy
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Publication:1718590
DOI10.1155/2014/519547zbMath1407.90017OpenAlexW1988121825WikidataQ59068176 ScholiaQ59068176MaRDI QIDQ1718590
Min Huang, Xingwei Wang, Chunhui Xu, Wai-Ki Ching, Kegui Chen
Publication date: 8 February 2019
Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/519547
Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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