Rebate decisions and leadership strategy in competing supply chain with heterogeneous consumers

DOI10.1155/2018/2598415zbMath1426.90166OpenAlexW2906033116WikidataQ128695319 ScholiaQ128695319MaRDI QIDQ1720611

Ziling Wang, Jackson Jinhong Mi, Bin Liu

Publication date: 8 February 2019

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/2598415

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Cites Work

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• The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales
• First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
• Price Leadership
• The impact of manufacturer rebates on supply chain profits

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