Contractual efficiency of PPP infrastructure projects: an incomplete contract model

DOI10.1155/2018/3631270zbMath1427.91153OpenAlexW2799379085WikidataQ129906341 ScholiaQ129906341MaRDI QIDQ1720792

Xianqiang Yang

Publication date: 8 February 2019

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/3631270

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Cites Work

• Evolutionary game analysis of the supervision behavior for public-private partnership projects with public participation
• Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
• A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence

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