Venture capital contracting with double-sided moral hazard and fairness concerns

DOI10.1155/2018/5296350zbMath1427.91152OpenAlexW2904785107WikidataQ128718592 ScholiaQ128718592MaRDI QIDQ1721069

Zhijun Hu, Jiajia Chang

Publication date: 8 February 2019

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/5296350

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Financial applications of other theories (91G80) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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Cites Work

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• Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *