A study on profit distribution for water rights cooperation taking into account dominant power of transfer sectors
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Publication:1721530
DOI10.1155/2018/8397837zbMath1427.91186OpenAlexW2891407277MaRDI QIDQ1721530
Publication date: 8 February 2019
Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/8397837
Cooperative games (91A12) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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