A comparative study of marketing channel multiagent Stackelberg model based on perfect rationality and fairness preference

DOI10.1155/2014/527458zbMath1474.91028OpenAlexW2120038013WikidataQ59039180 ScholiaQ59039180MaRDI QIDQ1724331

Yiwan Sun, Chuan Ding, Xu Yang, Kai-Hong Wang

Publication date: 14 February 2019

Published in: Abstract and Applied Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/527458

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Channel coordination mechanism with retailers having fairness preference -- an improved quantity discount mechanism
• Coordination of a supply chain with one-manufacturer and two-retailers under demand promotion and disruption management decisions
• Designing Pricing Contracts for Boundedly Rational Customers: Does the Framing of the Fixed Fee Matter?
• Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining Behavior
• Social Preferences and Supply Chain Performance: An Experimental Study
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

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