The influence analysis of number of functional logistics service providers on quality supervision game in LSSC with compensation strategy

DOI10.1155/2014/956569zbMath1474.91029OpenAlexW2050806730WikidataQ59043108 ScholiaQ59043108MaRDI QIDQ1725379

Yijia Wang, Weihua Liu, Zhicheng Liang, Xiao Yan Liu

Publication date: 14 February 2019

Published in: Abstract and Applied Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/956569

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (1)

Quality spillover, tariff, and multinational firms' local sourcing strategies

Cites Work

• Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer
• Producer-Supplier Contracts with Incomplete Information
• Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
• Quality Implications of Warranties in a Supply Chain
• Quality Improvement Incentives and Product Recall Cost Sharing Contracts
• Stochastic Inventory Systems in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information: Cycle Stocks, Safety Stocks, and Consignment Stock
• Penalties, rewards, and inspection: provisions for quality in supply chain contracts
• Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information

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