Modelling incomplete information in Boolean games using possibilistic logic
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Publication:1726370
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2017.10.017zbMath1452.68184OpenAlexW2765549487MaRDI QIDQ1726370
Sofie De Clercq, Martine De Cock, Steven Schockaert, Ann Nowé
Publication date: 20 February 2019
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8607737
Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Reasoning under uncertainty in the context of artificial intelligence (68T37)
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