Approximating maxmin strategies in imperfect recall games using A-loss recall property
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Publication:1726399
DOI10.1016/j.ijar.2017.11.010zbMath1457.91063OpenAlexW2769877980WikidataQ59209593 ScholiaQ59209593MaRDI QIDQ1726399
Jiří Čermák, Branislav Bošanský, Karel Horák, Michal Pěchouček, Viliam Lisý
Publication date: 20 February 2019
Published in: International Journal of Approximate Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2017.11.010
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