A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem

DOI10.1155/2018/8512608zbMath1422.91434OpenAlexW2885884572WikidataQ129429417 ScholiaQ129429417MaRDI QIDQ1727286

Publication date: 20 February 2019

Published in: Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/8512608

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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