Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2018.11.009zbMath1419.91075OpenAlexW2904876353WikidataQ128767292 ScholiaQ128767292MaRDI QIDQ1727718

Kimmo Berg

Publication date: 20 February 2019

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.11.009

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessubgame perfectionorthogonal convexitymixed strategypublic correlationset-valued games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91)

Related Items

Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games, Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames

Cites Work

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