A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
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Publication:1727951
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.001zbMath1409.91181OpenAlexW2560399714MaRDI QIDQ1727951
Vicki Knoblauch, James W. Boudreau
Publication date: 21 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.12.001
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Matching models (91B68) Welfare economics (91B15)
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