An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.03.001zbMath1409.91065OpenAlexW2528655899MaRDI QIDQ1728214

Ata Atay

Publication date: 22 February 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycoreassignment gamevon Neumann-morgenstern stable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?

Cites Work

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• Assignment games with stable core
• Buyer-seller exactness in the assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core

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