The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
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Publication:1728216
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2017.03.005zbMath1409.91025OpenAlexW2596296916MaRDI QIDQ1728216
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.005
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (8)
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games ⋮ Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ The balanced contributions property for equal contributors ⋮ Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies ⋮ Marginality and the position value ⋮ Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values ⋮ Marginality and Myerson values ⋮ Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
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