Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2017.07.001zbMath1409.91102OpenAlexW2734375530MaRDI QIDQ1728305

Anna Moskalenko, Attila Tasnádi, Dezső Bednay

Publication date: 22 February 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruledictatorshipvoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

On the manipulability of a class of social choice functions: plurality \(k\)th rules ⋮ Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Dictatorship versus manipulability

Cites Work

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• Metric rationalization of social welfare functions
• Distance rationalization of voting rules
• Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice
• Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules
• Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment

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