Licensing and information disclosure under asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.01.005zbMath1431.91218OpenAlexW2907660105WikidataQ128626762 ScholiaQ128626762MaRDI QIDQ1728508

Haejun Jeon

Publication date: 25 February 2019

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationreal optionslicensingOR in research and developmentinformation disclosurevertical separation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (6)

Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation ⋮ Information disclosure in a supply chain with copycat threat ⋮ Blockchain's role in e-commerce sellers' decision-making on information disclosure under competition ⋮ Dilemma of quality information disclosure in technology licensing ⋮ An analysis of technology licensing and parallel importation under different market structures ⋮ Information acquisition and voluntary disclosure with supply chain and capital market interaction

Cites Work

• Royalty licensing
• Optimal patent policy in the presence of vertical separation
• On monopolistic licensing strategies under asymmetric information
• Patents and R\& D with imitation and licensing
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• The Dynamics of Going Public*
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• Strategic Spillovers and Incentives for Research and Development
• Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure
• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting

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