Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
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Publication:1729670
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.006zbMath1419.91344OpenAlexW2908366390MaRDI QIDQ1729670
Publication date: 28 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.12.006
outside optionall-pay auctionasymmetric auctionconflict mediationdistributional strategyendogenous conflict
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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