Learning about analysts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.001zbMath1419.91445OpenAlexW3122920671MaRDI QIDQ1729680

Jesper Rüdiger, Adrien Vigier

Publication date: 28 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

social learningreputationscareer concernsanalysts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise

Cites Work

• Informational cascades with endogenous prices: the role of risk aversion
• Information aggregation in financial markets with career concerns
• Social learning in a changing world
• Financial crises as herds: overturning the critiques
• The speed of information revelation in a financial market mechanism
• Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets
• Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
• Market Crashes and Informational Avalanches
• Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning
• How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?

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