Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.009zbMath1409.91017OpenAlexW2904552822WikidataQ128761646 ScholiaQ128761646MaRDI QIDQ1730143

Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 11 March 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.009

zbMATH Keywords

decompositioncorecooperative game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games ⋮ Submodular functions and rooted trees

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
• A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• Game Theory

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