Full revelation under optional verification

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.021zbMath1409.91052OpenAlexW2903785725WikidataQ128739723 ScholiaQ128739723MaRDI QIDQ1730145

Simon Schopohl

Publication date: 11 March 2019

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.021

zbMATH Keywords

communicationcheap-talksender-receiver gameverifiable informationcostly disclosurefull revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult

Cites Work

• Verifiable disclosure
• Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission
• Strategic Information Transmission

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