Undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibria in quasi-supermodular games with monotonic externalities
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Publication:1730170
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.01.005zbMath1409.91014OpenAlexW2909109916MaRDI QIDQ1730170
Publication date: 11 March 2019
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.01.005
Cites Work
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- On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge
- Undominated equilibria in games with strategic complementarities
- Coalition-proof equilibrium
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property.
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Monotone Comparative Statics
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