Gauss-Seidel method for multi-leader-follower games
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Publication:1730406
DOI10.1007/s10957-018-1391-5zbMath1419.91167OpenAlexW2892754290WikidataQ129246113 ScholiaQ129246113MaRDI QIDQ1730406
Publication date: 6 March 2019
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-018-1391-5
Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)
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