The family of ideal values for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/S10957-018-1259-8zbMath1419.91060OpenAlexW2790542255MaRDI QIDQ1730792

René van den Brink, Hao Sun, Wenna Wang, Gen-Jiu Xu

Publication date: 6 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/e598eaf6-73c7-4959-9ba3-bc3fefac5ae2

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydynamic process\(m\)-individual expected rewardCIS and EANS valuesfamily of ideal values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Null, nullifying, and necessary agents: parallel characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley values ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Nash equilibrium seeking in quadratic noncooperative games under two delayed information-sharing schemes ⋮ Necessary players and values

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