Robust bilateral trade with discrete types

DOI10.1007/s13675-018-0106-xzbMath1409.90108OpenAlexW2895817455MaRDI QIDQ1731822

Mustafa Çelebi Pinar, Kamyar Kargar, Halil Ibrahim Bayrak

Publication date: 14 March 2019

Published in: EURO Journal on Computational Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/49823

zbMATH Keywords

robustnessambiguitymechanism design\(\phi \)-divergence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Uses Software

• Ipopt

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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