Cooperation enhanced by the `survival of the fittest' rule in prisoner's dilemma games on complex networks

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.011zbMath1410.91088OpenAlexW2061299260WikidataQ50673457 ScholiaQ50673457MaRDI QIDQ1732922

Tianguang Chu, Jianlei Zhang, Chunyan Zhang

Publication date: 26 March 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.011

zbMATH Keywords

strategyevolutionary game theorycoevolution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12) Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Evolutionary dynamics in division of labor games on cycle networks ⋮ On exploring the genetic algorithm for modeling the evolution of cooperation in a population ⋮ The evolution of cooperation with different fitness functions using probabilistic cellular automata

Cites Work

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• Renormalization group analysis of the small-world network model
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• The replicator equation on graphs
• Active linking in evolutionary games
• Statistical mechanics of complex networks
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
• The Structure and Function of Complex Networks
• Coherence Resonance in a Noise-Driven Excitable System
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks

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