Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders

DOI10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8zbMath1410.91247OpenAlexW2790062747MaRDI QIDQ1733323

Yizhaq Minchuk, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 21 March 2019

Published in: Optimization Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1248-8

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsseparating equilibriumselling mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Ranking sealed high-bid and open asymmetric auctions
• Simultaneous Ad Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF ASYMMETRY ON REVENUE IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS

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