Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
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Publication:1733377
DOI10.1007/s00224-017-9832-3zbMath1409.91147OpenAlexW2777656592WikidataQ59606142 ScholiaQ59606142MaRDI QIDQ1733377
George Christodoulou, Stefano Leonardi, Alkmini Sgouritsa
Publication date: 21 March 2019
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-017-9832-3
Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic programming (90C15) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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