The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games

DOI10.1007/S00224-017-9829-YzbMath1411.90078OpenAlexW2777156773MaRDI QIDQ1733381

Guido Schäfer, Pieter Kleer

Publication date: 21 March 2019

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/27269

zbMATH Keywords

perturbationsselfish routingbiased price of anarchydeviation ratioprice of risk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Communication networks in operations research (90B18)

Related Items (1)

Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective

Cites Work

• On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
• Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
• Equilibrium routing under uncertainty
• On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
• A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
• A Mean-Risk Model for the Traffic Assignment Problem with Stochastic Travel Times
• Efficiency of Restricted Tolls in Non-atomic Network Routing Games
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
• Stronger Bounds on Braess's Paradox and the Maximum Latency of Selfish Routing
• Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players
• Risk-Averse Selfish Routing
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria

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