Price of anarchy for highly congested routing games in parallel networks

DOI10.1007/s00224-017-9834-1zbMath1411.91136OpenAlexW2782168685MaRDI QIDQ1733382

Roberto Cominetti, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Marco Scarsini

Publication date: 21 March 2019

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-017-9834-1

zbMATH Keywords

price of anarchyregularly varying functionswardrop equilibriumhigh congestionnonatomic routing gamesparallel networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (3)

Price of anarchy for parallel link networks with generalized mean objective ⋮ The price of anarchy in routing games as a function of the demand ⋮ When is Selfish Routing Bad? The Price of Anarchy in Light and Heavy Traffic

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