An almost ideal coordination mechanism for unrelated machine scheduling
DOI10.1007/s00224-018-9857-2zbMath1411.90108arXiv1605.04674OpenAlexW2790616850WikidataQ130167135 ScholiaQ130167135MaRDI QIDQ1733383
Angelo Fanelli, Ioannis Caragiannis
Publication date: 21 March 2019
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems, Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.04674
machine schedulingschedulingunrelated machinesprice of anarchypotential gamesprice of stabilitycoordination mechanismcoordination mechanisms
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
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- Coordination mechanisms
- Coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling
- Efficient coordination mechanisms for unrelated machine scheduling
- Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games
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- Coordination mechanisms from (almost) all scheduling policies
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- Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling
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