Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
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Publication:1733386
DOI10.1007/s00224-018-9865-2zbMath1422.91067OpenAlexW2802632589WikidataQ129882273 ScholiaQ129882273MaRDI QIDQ1733386
Yair Zick, Joel Oren, Yuval Filmus, Yoram Bachrach
Publication date: 21 March 2019
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-018-9865-2
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