Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting

DOI10.3103/S0278641918040064zbMath1419.91256OpenAlexW2903157436MaRDI QIDQ1735210

Natalia M. Novikova, Irina I. Pospelova

Publication date: 28 March 2019

Published in: Moscow University Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3103/s0278641918040064

zbMATH Keywords

Hall's theoremintuitive rationalityveto-voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

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• Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. I: Conditions for making the given decision
• Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
• Properties of voting with veto power
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto
• A lemma in open sequential voting by veto
• Controlling the order of moves in voting by veto. II. Algorithms for constructing an optimal order of moves

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