Self-covariant and consistent solutions of transferable utility cooperative games

DOI10.1134/S0005117918120111zbMath1411.91050OpenAlexW2903611809WikidataQ128750407 ScholiaQ128750407MaRDI QIDQ1735231

Elena B. Yanovskaya

Publication date: 28 March 2019

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117918120111

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamecovarianceconsistent extensionstandard solutionconstrained Egalitarian solutionequal share solutionself-covariance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• The positive core of a cooperative game
• The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
• Egalitarian solutions in the core
• A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• EGALITARIAN SETS FOR TU-GAMES
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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