A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.007zbMath1419.91343OpenAlexW1988539619MaRDI QIDQ1735729

Berthold Vöcking

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.007

zbMATH Keywords

multi-unit auctionsmechanism designuniversal truthfulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Randomized algorithms (68W20)

Related Items (1)

Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Discrete Dynamic Programming and Capital Allocation
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Fast Approximation Algorithms for the Knapsack and Sum of Subset Problems
• On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
• Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions
• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• Black-Box Randomized Reductions in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
• The Smoothed Number of Pareto Optimal Solutions in Bicriteria Integer Optimization
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Random knapsack in expected polynomial time
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