A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
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Publication:1735729
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.007zbMath1419.91343OpenAlexW1988539619MaRDI QIDQ1735729
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.12.007
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Randomized algorithms (68W20)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Discrete Dynamic Programming and Capital Allocation
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
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- The Smoothed Number of Pareto Optimal Solutions in Bicriteria Integer Optimization
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Random knapsack in expected polynomial time
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