Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.006zbMath1419.91466OpenAlexW1992169984MaRDI QIDQ1735732

Svetlana Olonetsky, Yishay Mansour, Amos Fiat, Katrina Ligett, Elias Koutsoupias

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120615-115818156

zbMATH Keywords

dynamicsCournot competitionBertrand competitiondelegation games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

How bad is the merger paradox? ⋮ How bad is the merger paradox? ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic Game Theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012

Cites Work

• Stackelberg equilibria in managerial delegation games
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• On the convergence of regret minimization dynamics in concave games

This page was built for publication: Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)