On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
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Publication:1735741
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.007zbMath1419.91082OpenAlexW2893200946MaRDI QIDQ1735741
Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham, Adrian Marple
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.007
Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Cites Work
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