Solving Becker's assortative assignments and extensions

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.005zbMath1419.91047OpenAlexW2806747482WikidataQ129215151 ScholiaQ129215151MaRDI QIDQ1735749

Neus Ybern, Carlos Rafels, F. Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://diposit.ub.edu/dspace/bitstream/2445/122644/1/E18-376_MtnezAlbeniz%2BRafels%2BYbern.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

corenucleolusassignment gameassortative market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

Assortative multisided assignment games: the extreme core points

Cites Work

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• Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
• Median stable matching for markets with wages
• Assignment markets with the same core
• Assignment games satisfy the CoMa-property
• Cooperative assignment games with the inverse Monge property
• The Shapley value of exact assignment games
• A survey on assignment markets
• On the dimension of the core of the assignment game
• Assignment games with stable core
• A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game
• Multisided matching games with complementarities
• Becker's assortative assignments: Stability and fairness
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

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