Coordination and evolutionary dynamics: when are evolutionary models reliable?
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Publication:1735757
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.002zbMath1419.91099OpenAlexW2897690313WikidataQ129088944 ScholiaQ129088944MaRDI QIDQ1735757
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.002
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