The instability of matching with overconfident agents
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Publication:1735759
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.001zbMath1419.91535OpenAlexW2897856596WikidataQ129057040 ScholiaQ129057040MaRDI QIDQ1735759
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/219214
Related Items (4)
Two-sided matching and strategic selection on freight resource sharing platforms ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
Cites Work
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- School choice: an experimental study
- Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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