Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1735771
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.003zbMath1419.91199OpenAlexW2901624104WikidataQ128883649 ScholiaQ128883649MaRDI QIDQ1735771
Luca Polonio, Giorgio Coricelli
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.003
Related Items (4)
Gain-loss framing in interdependent choice ⋮ Classical and belief-based gift exchange models: theory and evidence ⋮ Bounded rationality for relaxing best response and mutual consistency: the quantal hierarchy model of decision making ⋮ Plasticity of strategic sophistication in interactive decision-making
Uses Software
Cites Work
- Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
- The framing of games and the psychology of play
- Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining
- Strategic sophistication and attention in games: an eye-tracking study
- Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs
- Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games
- Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: a methodological inquiry and experimental test
- Ignoring the rationality of others: evidence from experimental normal-form games.
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost wallet game
- First- and second-order subjective expectations in strategic decision-making: experimental evidence
- A theory of reciprocity
- Self-referential thinking and equilibrium as states of mind in games: fMRI evidence
- Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
- Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
- Model-Based Clustering, Discriminant Analysis, and Density Estimation
- Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games
- Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Revealed Altruism
- An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
- Measuring Expectations
- Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism
This page was built for publication: Testing the level of consistency between choices and beliefs in games using eye-tracking
