Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.11.005zbMath1419.91327OpenAlexW2901426355MaRDI QIDQ1735774

Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.005

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationsequentialsecond-price auctionsbudgets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Robust optimization strategies for seller based on uncertainty sets in context of sequential auction ⋮ Loss aversion in sequential auctions ⋮ Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization ⋮ An experimental study on sequential auctions with privately known capacities

Cites Work

• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints
• Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
• A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders
• Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints
• Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget

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