Stochastic stability under logit choice in coalitional bargaining problems

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.009zbMath1419.91054OpenAlexW2901357460WikidataQ128885171 ScholiaQ128885171MaRDI QIDQ1735775

Ryoji Sawa

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://tsukuba.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/51828/files/GEB_113-633.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilitycoalitionbargainingcoalitional bargaininglogit-response dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games, Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets, Efficiency and stability in a process of teams formation

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