Voting with public information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1735780
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.011zbMath1419.91253OpenAlexW3122272368WikidataQ128760610 ScholiaQ128760610MaRDI QIDQ1735780
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp191.pdf
collective decision-makingstrategic votingpublic informationinformation disclosurecommittee designoptimal voting rule
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