The informativeness principle without the first-order approach

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2018.08.006zbMath1419.91417OpenAlexW3123518364WikidataQ129253762 ScholiaQ129253762MaRDI QIDQ1735785

Alex Edmans, Pierre Chaigneau, Daniel Gottlieb

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://lbsresearch.london.edu/id/eprint/1002/1/Chaigneau_Edmans_Gottleib_Informative-principle.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

contract theoryprincipal-agent modelinformativeness principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites Work

• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
• Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
• Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
• A general Lagrangian approach for non-concave moral hazard problems

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