The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.007zbMath1419.91401OpenAlexW2584867711WikidataQ128965213 ScholiaQ128965213MaRDI QIDQ1735792

Ryan Tierney

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.007

zbMATH Keywords

indivisible goodsincentive-compatibilitycommonsmin-price equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evaluating assignment without transfers: a market perspective
• Advances in mathematical economics. Vol. 6
• Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
• On cores and indivisibility
• Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• The relation between monotonicity and strategy-proofness
• The assignment game. I: The core
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control
• Minimum partition of a matroid into independent subsets

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