The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.005zbMath1419.91097OpenAlexW2909071460MaRDI QIDQ1735801

Hannes Rusch

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

evolutioncooperationcollaborationstrategy choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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