Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004zbMath1419.91536OpenAlexW2903919846MaRDI QIDQ1735807

David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingcompetitive equilibriumcomparative statics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Does it make sense to analyse a two-sided market as a multi-choice game?, Axioms for the optimal stable rules and fair-division rules in a multiple-partners job market

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game
• Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
• The central assignment game and the assignment markets
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
• On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
• The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
• Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes