Comparative statics in the multiple-partners assignment game
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Publication:1735807
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004zbMath1419.91536OpenAlexW2903919846MaRDI QIDQ1735807
David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor
Publication date: 29 March 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.004
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